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I. Introduction 
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1 was a huge leap forward 
for the millions of disabled individuals who have struggled to fully enter the rich mosaic of the 
American mainstream. 2 Title III of the ADA (Title III)3 prohibits discrimination against disabled 
individuals in "public accommodations. "4 This note will explore how the courts have broadened 
the definition of a "public accommodation" to not only encompass physical entities, but also 
organizations which the courts have deemed to have a sufficient nexus to a physical facility, thus 
themselves becoming "public accommodations" within the definition of Title III. Furthermore, 
this note will analyze what constitutes a sufficient nexus between a sporting event, the athletes 
and the physical field of play in order to allow Title III protections to be extended to sporting 
events. In examining the courts' classification of certain organizations as "public 
accommodations," this note will concentrate on sporting events and athletes and the impact that 
Title III has had on such events. This note will also briefly address how the courts' broad 
definition of "public accommodations" has led to modifications of the sporting events at issue. 
Part II will explore the elements of a successful claim under Title III, the statutory definition 
of"public accommodation," and the infancy of the judicial interpretation of"public 
accommodations." Part III will focus on the Supreme Court decision of PGA Tour, Inc. v. 
Martin5, including the expansion of Title III protections to competitors in professional sporting 
events. Part IV will focus on Shepherd v. United States Olympic Commission6 and the court's 
1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 12101-12213,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2009). 
2 Lainie Rutkow, Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, Banning Second-hand Smoke in Indoor Public Places Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Legal and Public Health Imperative, 40 CONN. L. REV. 409, 414 (2007). 
3 42 u.s.c. §§ 12181-12189. 
4 § 12182(a)-(b). 
5 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
6 Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Colo 2006). 
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refusal to extend Title III protections to sporting events which have high admission standards. 
Part V will present the conclusion. 
II. The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Helping Hand to Independence for 
Disabled Individuals 
The ADA was signed into law by then-President George H.W. Bush on July 26, 1990 and 
heralded as a "declaration of independence for people with disabilities."7 In crafting the 
legislation, Congress meant to "invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities."8 The 
Legislature granted the ADA a broad mandate intended "to eliminate discrimination against 
disabled individuals, and to integrate them into the economic and social mainstream of American 
Iife."9 The passage of the ADA was meant to ensure that disabled individuals were given the 
basic guarantees for which they had worked so long and so hard for, independence, freedom of 
choice, control of their lives and the opportunity to blend fully and equally into the rich mosaic 
of the American mainstream. 10 
There seems to be no doubt that Congress intended the ADA to offer sweeping remedial 
powers for a broad array of discrimination 11 as its aim was to ensure that the law was as strong 
an anti-discrimination statute as possible.12 The ADA was created to ensure that disabled 
individuals enjoy the same access to the American mainstream as non-disabled individuals. 13 
A. Making a Claim Under Title Ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
7 Paul V. Sullivan, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Analysis of Title Ill and Applicable Case Law, 
29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (1995). 
8 /d. § 1210l(b). 
9 Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011). 
10 Rutkow, supra note I, at 409. 
11 See§ 12101. 
12Rutkow, supra note I, at 414. 
13 Judd v. Hogsten, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51447, *5 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2006) 
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The purpose of Title III "is to extend these general prohibitions against discrimination to 
privately operated public accommodations and to bring individuals with disabilities into the 
economic and social mainstream of American life." 14 A successful claim under the ADA must 
show that a disabled individual was discriminated against through an act or omission in a place 
of public accommodation.15 
The ADA defines a disabled individual as an individual who has a physical or mental 
impairment which interferes with major life activities, has a record of possessing such 
impairment, and is perceived to have such impairment.16 
The second element of a Title III claim has been defined broadly, in keeping with the 
legislative intent to afford disabled individuals sweeping protections against discrimination under 
the ADA, and may be met by either an action or an omission.17 An omission may be categorized 
as a denial of participation, participation in unequal benefit or a separate benefit. 18 A denial of 
participation claim arises when a disabled individual is denied the right to participate in or take 
advantage of an entity or benefits provided by that entity. 19 A participation claim arises when a 
disabled individual is allowed to participate in or take advantage of an entity or benefits provided 
by that entity to an extent that is not equal to the benefits afforded to non-disabled individuals. 20 
A separate benefit claim arises when a disabled individual is afforded a benefit that is different or 
14 H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990). 
15 42 U.S.C.S. § 12182(a)-(b) (West 2009); See e.g. Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Concorde Gaming Corp., 158 
F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359-1360 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
16 § 12102(a). 
17 See generally Id § 12182(b). 
18 Id 
19 Id § 12182(b)(l)(A)(i) (Under a denial of participation claim, it is "discriminatory to subject an individual or 
class of individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through 
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in 
or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.") 
20 Id § 12182(b)(l)(A)(ii) (Under a participation in an unequal benefit claim, it is "discriminatory to afford an 
individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or 
through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, 
service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals.") 
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separate from that afforded to non-disabled individuals, unless such separation is necessary and 
is effective as that provided to non-disabled individuals. 21 
The third element of a Title III claim requires that the discriminatory act or omission occur in 
a place of"public accommodation."22 In accordance with the legislative intent that the ADA 
expend protection for disabled individuals; private entities, in addition to governmental entities, 
may be the providers of "public accommodation" and thus fall under the purview of Title III. 23 
Title III provides no definition of what constitutes a "public accommodation" and instead, relies 
on the cryptic pronouncement that a private entity is considered a "public accommodation," 
when it "own[s], lease[s], or lease[s] to, or operate[s] a place of public accommodation"24 and 
"the operations of such entities [must] affect commerce."25 Perhaps hoping to educate by 
example, Title III enumerates a broad swath of entities which would constitute "public 
accommodation" within the purview of Title III.26 Most relevant to this note's topic are "places 
of exercise or recreation (e.g. gymnasiums, health spas, bowling alleys, golf courses). "27 Thus, 
Title III provides that if an entity provides a "public accommodation," then the entity is 
prohibited from discriminating against disabled individuals under Title III and is obligated to 
make the "public accommodation" premises readily accessible to disabled individuals.28 
21 /d. § 12182 12182(b)(l)(A)(iii) (Under a separate benefit claim, it is "discriminatory to provide an individual or 
class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through 
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation 
that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide the 
individual or class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other 
oppornmity that is as effective as that provided to others.) 
2 /d § 12182(a)-(b). 
23 Sullivan, supra note 5, at 1124. 
24 § 12182. 
25 Jd ("commerce is defmed as "travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication (A) among the 
several States; (B) between any foreign coun(ry or any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points 
in the same State but through another State or foreign coun(ry.) 
26 See generally /d.§ 12181(7). 
27 Jd § 12181(7)(L). 
28 Sullivan, supra note 5, at 1124. 
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B. Judicial Interpretation and Application of Title III's "Public Accommodation" 
Requirement 
In accordance with legislative intent in enacting the ADA, the Supreme Court has held that 
the phrase "public accommodation" "should be construed liberally to afford people with 
disabilities equal access to the wide variety of establishments available to the nondisabled. "29 
The courts have broadly expanded the defmition of "public accommodation" to include 
independent contractors in a public hospital/0 a NCAA university's academic policy,31 and a 
golf tournament. 32 
Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center, centered on Eliot Menkowitz, an 
orthopedic surgeon who held an appointment at the Pottstown Memorial Medical Center.33 
Menkowitz alleged that, upon being diagnosed with attention-deficit disorder in July 1995, 
Pottstown Memorial summarily suspended his medical privileges without notice or hearing, in 
contravention of the hospital's own by-laws, and in the face of testimony from Menkowitz's 
clinical psychologist and treating physician stating that "the disorder would not affect his 
[Menkowitz's] ability to treat patients or properly interact with the hospital staff."34 Menkowitz 
alleged that Pottstown Memorial discriminated against him because of his disability and was 
therefore in violation of Title III?5 
The Menkowitz court determined that, as an independent contractor of Pottstown Memorial, 
deemed to be a place of "public accommodation," Menkowitz may assert a claim under Title III 
29 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676-77 (2001) quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 59 (1989) and H.R. Rep. 
No. 101-485, at 100 (1990). 
30 Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem'l Med. Ctr., !54 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1998). 
31 Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (E.D. Wash. 2001). 
32 PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 667. 
33 Menkowitz, !54 F.3d at 115. 
34 Id 
35 Id 
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as "an individual who is denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation. "36 In finding 
that a disabled independent contractor working in a place of "public accommodation" may 
invoke the protections of Title III, the Menkowitz court reasoned that their decision furthered the 
legislative intent of applying the ADA broadly.37 The court reflected that since independent 
contractors were not employees under Title I of the ADA, a failure to give them statutory 
protection under Title III when working in a "public accommodation" would immunize 
discrimination against them.38 The Menkowitz court determined that such a result was contrary to 
the legislative intent of providing broad protections to disabled individuals when enacting the 
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,40 the United States Supreme Court read "public 
accommodation" broadly when it determined that PGA Tournament golfers were customers 
within the scope of Title III as tournament entry was allowed to any member of the public who 
could meet nominal entrance requirements.41 Although the petitioner had argued that their golf 
courses were not a "public accommodation" in the lower courts, the petitioner acquiesced that 
their golf courses constituted "public accommodation" at the time of their appeal to the Supreme 
Court.42 Notwithstanding the petitioner's acquiescence, the PGA Tour Court nonetheless 
examined the issue.43 
The PGA Tour Court determined that the golf courses do constitute "public accommodation" 
since "petitioner's golf courses and their qualifying rounds fit comfortably within the coverage 
36 Id at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37 ld at 123. 
38 ld 
39 ld 
40 Discussed infra at I 0. 
41 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 680 (2001). 
42 ld at 678. 
43 ld 
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of Title III."44 In determining that the petitioner's golf courses were "public accommodation," 
the Court noted that petitioner's events were hosted on golf courses and that golf courses were 
explicitly mentioned in the Title III text at§ 12181(7)(L).45 PGA Tour also confirmed that highly 
selective admission criteria for users of a facility did not automatically exclude the facility from 
being a "public accommodation."46 
The PGA Tour Court determined that petitioners had two sets of customers, the spectators 
watching the tournament live and the athletes competing in the tournament.47 The Court 
concluded that both sets of customers were protected under Title III. 48 The Court reasoned that 
as the golftournament was open to participants from the public, so long as such participants 
qualified for the tournament, they were customers of the petitioner's "public accommodation."49 
The Court's rationale indicated that athletes in sporting events, so long as such events were 
accessible to the public in some way, would fall under Title III. 
The PGA Tour Court examined petitioner's contention that the golfers were independent 
contractors and therefore fell outside Title III, but declined to issue a ruling on the matter50 since 
such a determination was unnecessary to rule on the case. However, in the Court's view, the 
privilege of participating in the golf tournament is a "privilege that petitioner makes available to 
members of the general public."51 The Court's language underscores its fundamental belief that, 
so long as the public has a chance to compete in the entities' athletic competition, the athletes 
themselves are a customer class protected by Title III. 
44 ld at 677. 
45 ld. 
46 Jd at 672-73. 
47 PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680. 
48Jd 
49 Jd at 679. 
50 Jd. at 680. 
51 Jd 
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The PGA Tour dissent emphatically disagreed with the majority, finding that the PGA Tour 
tournament athletes were independent contractors and therefore excluded from Title III 
protection. 52 The PGA Tour dissent's conclusion is therefore at odds with the Menkowitz court's 
holding that an independent contractor is entitled to Title III protection so long as the 
discrimination occurs in a "public accommodation."53 The dissent likened the respondent golf 
tournament participant to an independent contractor rather than a customer because he was "not a 
customer buying recreation or entertainment; he was a professional athlete selling it. "54 
Therefore, in the dissent's eyes, any professional athlete would be an independent contractor and 
thus not eligible for Title III protection, even if the athletes competed in a "public 
accommodation." 
In Matthews v. NCAA, Anthony Matthews, who was diagnosed with a learning disability, 
alleged that the NCAA violated the ADA "when it declared [Matthews] academically ineligible 
to play intercollegiate football."55 The NCAA sets standards that student-athletes of its member 
universities must meet; with one such standard known as the 75/25 Rule whereby "student-
athletes [must] earn 75 percent of their annual required credit hours during the regular academic 
year."56 Although NCAA granted Matthews a waiver of the 75/25 Rule for one year, the NCAA 
denied such a waiver the following year, stating that Matthews' academic woes were a result of a 
"lack of effort, [and not due] to his learning disability."57 
52 PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The only distinctive feature of places of public 
accommodation is that they accommodate the public, and Congress could have no conceivable reason for according 
the employees and independent contractors of such businesses protections that employees and independent 
contractors of other businesses do not enjoy.") 
53 /d. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem'l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 1998). 
54 PGA Tour, Inc. at 696 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
55 Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1213 (E.D. Wash. 2001). 
56 /d. at 1215. 
57/d. at 1216. 
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The Matthews court noted that while the NCAA "exercises little, if any, control over the 
operation of athletic facilities such as college football stadiums," the NCAA collects revenue 
from bowl games in which its member universities participate in. 58 Most relevant to the topic at 
hand, Matthews determined that the NCAA was a "public accommodation" within the meaning 
of Title III "based upon the large degree of control the NCAA exerts over which students may 
access the arena of competitive college football. 59 In determining that the NCAA is a "public 
accommodation" within the purview of Title III, the Matthews court looked to a "nexus" which 
must "exist between the physical place of public accommodation and the services or privileges 
denied in a discriminatory manner."60 
In interpreting Title III's circular defmition of"public accommodation,"61 the courts have 
expended the definition to include not only those entities with a physical component but also 
organizations which have a "nexus" to a physical entity which would qualify as a "public 
accommodation." 
III. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin: Defining "Public Accommodations" to Reach Beyond 
Physical Premises 
PGA Tour quickly disabuses readers ofthe notion that athletic competitions fall outside 
Title III, noting while there is an explicit exemption of "'private clubs or establishments' and 
'religious organizations or entities' from Title III's coverage, Congress made no such exemption 
for athletic competitions, much less did it give sports organizations carte-blanche authority to 
58 Id at 1214. 
59 Id at 1223. 
60 !d. at 1219. 
61 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (West 2009) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.") 
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exempt themselves from the fundamental alteration inquiry by deeming any rule, no matter how 
peripheral to the competition, to be essential."62 
The defendant, PGA Tour, Inc., sponsors professional golf tournaments that are typically 
four day events held on courses that the company leases and operates. 63 The standard format of 
the tournament is that all participants compete over two days and only those players who qualify 
then play an additional two days and are awarded prize money based on their cumulative score 
from all four days ofplay. 64 PGA Tour's income from the golf tournaments is substantial with 
"revenues generated by television, admissions, concessions, and contributions from cosponsors 
amount[ing] to about $300 million a year, much of which is distributed in prize money."65 
Golfers can gain entry onto the tour in two ways, through merit-based achievements or 
through a qualifying round.66 The merit-based ways in which a golfer can gain entry onto the 
tour are multiple and include achievements such as being a top-15 money winner on the tour or 
playing three Nike Tour events per year.67 The general public may also enter the Tour through 
the "Q-School," essentially a qualifying school for the Tour, by paying a $3,000 fee and 
submitting two letters of references. 68 Qualification for the tour through the "Q school" is the 
most common way of qualifying. 69 
The plaintiff, Casey Martin, is a disabled individual as defmed by the ADA.1° Martin suffers 
from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, which obstructs blood flow between his heart and 
62 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, n.51 (2001). 
63 !d. at 665. 
64 Id 
65 Id 
66 Id 
67 !d. 
68 Id 
69 Id 
70 Id at 667-68. 
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right leg and has caused atrophy of his right leg.71 Martin is also an extremely gifted golfer.72 As 
an amateur, Martin won 17 OregonGolf Association junior events, the state championship as a 
high school senior, and the 1994 NCAA championship while on the Stanford University golf 
team.73 Martin also attained success as a professional, qualifYing for the Nike Tour in 1998 and 
1999 and the PGA Tour in 2000.74 Martin enjoyed particular success in the 1999 season, entering 
24 events, qualifying 13 times, and having 6 top-1 0 finishes, coming in second twice and third 
once.75 
However, Martin's Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome rendered him unable to walk the 
golf course. 76 Martin contended that walking the golf course, as required by PGA Tour in the 
latter rounds of the tournament, would have caused him "pain, fatigue, and anxiety, but also 
create[] a significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia so 
badly that an amputation might be required."77 It is also notable that, while golf carts are 
prohibited in the last two rounds of the tournament, they are allowed in the first two rounds of 
the tournament as well as in competitions governed by the "rules of golf' such as the Ladies 
Professional Golf Association (LPGA).78 When Martin's request for the use of a golf cart in the 
latter rounds of the PGA Tour tournament was denied, Martin sued for an injunction allowing 
him to use a golf cart in the tournament. 79 
PGA Tour disputed neither Martin's status as a disabled individual under the ADA nor 
Martin's contention that his disability would prevent him from walking the golf course as 
71 Id at 668. 
72 ld at 667-68. 
73 ld 
74 ld 
75 ld 
76 Id 
77 Id at 668. 
78 See ld at 666. 
79 ld at 669. 
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mandated by the rules. 80 Initially, PGA Tour argued that it was exempt from coverage under 
Title III because it is a "private club or establishment," or in the alternative, that it was exempt 
from coverage under Title III because the Tour's areas of play did not constitute "public 
accommodation."81 On appeal to the Supreme Court, PGA Tour further argued that the 
"competing golfers are not members of [a] class protected by Title III of the ADA."82 PGA Tour 
contended that professional golfers are entertainers and are therefore not the client or customer of 
a "public accommodation" within the purview of Title III. 83 Therefore, Martin should not be 
afforded the protection of Title III of the ADA.84 
The Supreme Court rejected PGA Tour's argument. The Court conceded that the 
tournaments provide the public watching the golfers with entertainment. 85 However, the Court 
found that PGA Tour also provided an opportunity to participate in the tournament via "Q-
school" qualification to any member ofthe public who can pay the $3,000 fee and provide two 
letters of recommendations. 86 Furthermore, the Court noted that a golfer can advance to the later 
rounds of the tournament, where golf carts are not allowed, so long as the golfer qualified in the 
earlier rounds, where golf carts are allowed. 87 
PGA Tour established that a membership organization can become a place of public 
accommodation to the extent that it operates or leases a place of public accommodation. 88 In a 
case decided prior to PGA Tour, Elitt v. US.A. Hockey, the Eastern District of Missouri 
determined that a youth hockey league did not become a "public accommodation" under the 
80 ld at 670. 
81 I d. at 669. 
82 Jd at 678. 
83 Jd 
84Jd 
85 Jd 
86 ld at 679-80. 
87 Jd at 679. 
88 Staley v. Nat'! Capital Area Council, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61986, *26 (D. Md. June 9, 2011). 
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ADA merely because the league's members met to practice in ice rinks, which are places of 
"public accommodation."89 The Elitt court reasoned that a membership organization is not a 
"public accommodation" within the purview of Title III because the categories listed in § 
12181(7) neither include nor are "sufficiently similar to any of the listed private entities in§ 
12181(7) to justifY their inclusion as places of public accommodation."90 The Elitt decision 
would seem to survive the Supreme Court's PGA Tour holding as the two cases are 
differentiated by the depth of the connection that the membership organizations had with the 
"public accommodations." While the Elitt youth hockey league merely practiced on a "public 
accommodation" rink, PGA Tour was more involved with the "public accommodation" golf 
course by selecting golfers for participation, allowing public participation contingent on the 
completion of relatively simple requirements, and profiting handsomely from the venture. 
In a decision rendered after PGA Tour, a district court examined whether the Boy Scouts 
of America was a "public accommodation" and could therefore be held liable for not providing 
interpreter services to a disabled Boy Scout member in violation of Title III.91 The Staley v. 
National Capital Area Council court reasoned that the mere fact that the Boy Scouts took trips to 
places of "public accommodation," such as public horseback riding, camping and skiing 
facilities, did not constitute a sufficient nexus to hold that the Boy Scout organization was a 
place of"public accommodation."92 In looking to PGA Tour for guidance, the Staley court 
emphasized that the membership organization in PGA Tour was found to be a "public 
accommodation" because the membership organization actually leased and operated the "public 
89 Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217,223 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
9<Jld 
91 Staley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61986 at *3-5. 
92 Id at *26. 
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accommodation" golf course.93 The Staley court reasoned that "[a]n organization does not 
become an owner or operator of a place of public accommodation merely because a group of its 
members determines to visit that place of public accommodation."94 Therefore, the Staley court 
reasoned that mere trips to places of "public accommodations" by the Boy Scouts is not enough 
to warrant finding that the Boy Scouts themselves are a place of"public accommodation."95 
Therefore Staley and Elitt both hold that mere trips to places of "public accommodations" are not 
sufficient to find that a membership organization has itself become a "public accommodation." 
This holding is in agreement with the PGA Tour Court which found that a membership 
organization must lease and operate a place of "public accommodation" in order to be considered 
a "public accommodation" within the purview of Title III.96 
While it seems to be clear that mere patronage of a "public accommodation" by a 
membership organization does not constitute a sufficient nexus, the question remains as to what 
exactly the nexus between the "public accommodation" and the membership organization must 
be before the organization will be considered a "public accommodation" within the purview of 
Title III. One such aspect of the nexus was clarified through the Martin and Matthews line of 
cases. In looking for a nexus between an organization and a "public accommodation" the courts 
must not focus only on the organization's control over the spectator public's access to the 
"public accommodation," but must also look to the organization's control over the field of play 
and athletes.97 By determining that Title III may be applied to the conditions of athletes 
participating in a field of play, the courts have inserted the protections of the ADA squarely into 
the field of competitive sports. 
93 Id 
94 Id at *28. 
95 Id. at *26. 
96 PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 677. 
97 Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1220 (E.D. Wash. 2001). 
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IV. Shepherd v. United States Olympic Commission: Charting Answers Beyond PGA 
Tour, Inc. v. Martin 
Shepherd v. United States Olympics Commission addressed the issue that PGA Tour left 
unanswered, "whether 'places of public accommodation' to which the non-disabled do not have 
general access fall within the purview of Title III. "98 The Shepherd plaintiffs, a group of current 
and former Paralympic athletes, argued that the United States Olympics Committee (USOC) was 
a "public accommodation" and should fall within Title III.99 The Shepherd plaintiffs reasoned 
that as the USOC-controlled training facilities constituted "public accommodation" and that the 
progranuning benefits offered by the USOC to athletes constituted "goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations" ofthose places of "public accommodation."100 
Therefore, the USOC's denial of the progranuning benefits to the Paralympians constituted 
discrimination against the disabled Paralympian athletes.101 
The Shepherd court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held that PGA Tour does not apply 
"[a]bsent any allegation that the privileges and benefits afforded athletes at the U.S. Olympic 
Training Centers are available to members of the general public vying for a berth on the 
U.S. Olympic or Paralympic team."102 The court reasoned that "there is something 
fundamentally different about the establishments and 'places of exercise and recreation' open to 
the non-disabled public generally -- which appear to be what the category at § 12181 (7)(L) 
describe[ s] -- and the United States' four Olympic Training Centers."103 Unlike the golf 
tournaments at the heart of PGA Tour, which were open to the public upon payment of $3,000 
98 Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1084 (D. Colo. 2006). 
99 ld at 1081. 
100 Jd 
101 Jd 
102 ld at 1083-84. 
103 ld at 1083. 
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and production of two letters of recommendation, 104 the Olympic facilities overseen by the 
USOC were not open to the general public. 105 Rather, the USOC's Olympic facilities were open 
only to those "already selected by the national governing bodies to the Olympic, Pan-American 
or Paralympic teams in their individual sports and identified as elite, world-class athletes."106 
In reviewing the case, the Shepherd court relied on their belief that the plaintiffs were not 
seeking to gain entry into the USOC's Olympic training facilities but rather to gain entry into the 
group of selected athletes which the country would put forth in competition, the Olympians.107 
The Shepherd court rationalized that the scope of the" public accommodation" within Title III 
could not be so greatly expanded so as to provide protection to disabled individuals seeking 
entry into a group which operated under its own selection criteria. 108 
Shepherd would subsequently be reviewed on appeal sub nom Hollonbeck v. United States 
Olympic Commission. 109 In Hollonbeck, the Tenth Circuit found that the USOC's practices were 
not discriminatory towards the Paralympians, in their role as representatives of disabled 
individuals, because there was "no fit between being an Olympic athlete and not being 
disabled."110 "The requirement of being an Olympic athlete is not directed at an effect or 
manifestation of a handicap"111 and there is simply nothing to suggest that by allowing the 
104 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 679-80 (2001). 
105 Shepherd, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. 
106 Jd. 
107 Jd. 
108 Shepherd, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1083; See Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (denying 
a Title III claim of a cognitively disabled child against U.S. amateur hockey organization because plaintiff was 
challenging the denial of participation in the youth hockey league instead of denial ofaccess to a place of 
accommodation, i.e. the ice rink.) 
109 Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 513 F.3d !191, 1193 (lOth Cir. 2008). 
110Jd. at 1196. 
111 Jd. at 1196-97. 
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USOC to exclusively fund the Olympians, that there was discrimination by proxy against the 
disabled.m 
Ordinarily, if a court finds that a disabled individual is otherwise qualified, it will look to 
whether reasonable accommodations could be made so that the disabled individual could 
participate in the "public accommodation."113 However, the Hollonbeck court did not examine 
the question of reasonable accommodations since the court could not make the determination of 
whether the Paralympians would otherwise qualifY as Olympians. 114 
V. The Landscape of "Public Accommodation" After Martin and Shepherd 
A. The nexus between an organization and a "public accommodation" 
While a standard has not been fully articulated, the courts look to a "nexus" between the 
organization's activities and the facility in which the activities are conducted in order to 
determine whether an activity is a public accommodation. 115 In determining whether an entity is 
a "public accommodation," the courts look to whether the entity encompasses a physical 
accommodation, such as a movie theater which is not wheelchair accessible116, or if the entity is 
an organization with no physical component, such as in the Hollonbecl! 17 line of cases. If a 
physical accommodation entity is sued as discriminatory, the courts look to 42 uses § 12181 to 
determine if the facility is a "public accommodation" within the scope of Title III. 118 If the 
112 Id at 1196. 
113 !d. 
114 !d. 
115 See Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1219 (E.D. Wash. 2001) ("Some 'nexus' must exist between 
physical place of public accommodation and the services or privileges denied in a discriminatory matter."). 
116 Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 
117 Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 513 F.3d 1191 (lOth Cir. 2008). 
118 42 U.S.C.S. § 12181 (West 2009). 
Page 117 
facility is determined to be a "public accommodation," the courts must then embark on an 
analysis of whether the requested modification is reasonable. 119 
The post-PGA Tour analysis is dependent on the type of entity being sued. The courts look to 
whether the entity is open to the public or closed to the public. Entities that are open to the public 
are those in which hypothetically anyone could join the organization. An example of an open 
entity is PGA Tour, the subject of the PGA Tour case, in which any player could participate in a 
golf tournament so long as the player paid an entry fee and was able to procure the necessary 
letters of recommendations.120 Entities closed to the public are those to which entrance can only 
be obtained through an intensive selection process. An example of a closed entity is the USOC 
which granted access to the Olympic facilities only to the few, carefully selected Olympic 
athletes. 121 Entities which are deemed to be closed to the public are not "public 
accommodations" and thus do not fall under Title III. Allowing the protections afforded by Title 
III to be applied to entities closed to the public would allow an unfair advantage to disabled 
individuals by allowing them to claim the ADA's protection and, in essence, circumvent the 
intensive selection process that has to be undergone by all individuals seeking admission to an 
entity closed to the public. 
Scholars have argued that Hollonbeck was decided incorrectly.122 They argue that the 
Hollonbeck court should have looked not at whether disabled Paralympians can become 
Olympians but whether the Paralympians were "qualified to receive the same benefits and 
programs that the USOC provides to Olympic athletes.123 Relying on statutory interpretation, 
119 Jd 
120 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 679 (2001). 
121 Shepherd, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. 
122 Jason Kroll, Second Class Athletes: The USOC 's Treatment of its Paralympians, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 
307, 338 (2005). 
123 Jd 
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scholars argue that it would be inconceivable that "the USOC emphasizes that since the ASA 
[Amateur Sports Act] provides for equitable treatment of women and prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin, Congress nevertheless intended to 
allow discrimination on the basis of disability."124 These scholars argue that an individual athlete 
is "otherwise qualified" for the USOC's assistance when the athlete qualifies "as an Olympic 
athlete, a Paralympic athlete, or a Pan American athlete."125 
Nonetheless, scholars have acknowledged that not every benefit and service offered by the 
USOC must be equally provided to Olympians and Paralympians due to differences between the 
two.126 For example, the Olympics are a bigger and more prominent event than the Paralympics 
and therefore "the Olympics require more funding because of its size and prominence."127 
However, the USOC's failure to provide certain "benefits fundamentally interferes with the 
ability of disabled athletes to compete."128 However, no guidance is given as to how to determine 
which benefits could be acceptably withheld as opposed to withholding of other benefits that 
would fundamentally interfere with the ability ofParalympic athletes' ability to compete. 
In criticizing the Hollonbeck decision, the scholars' principal argument is that the 
Paralympians are a proxy for disabled individuals. 129 Thus, to declare Paralympians not qualified 
for benefits provided to the Olympic athletes is facially discriminatory behavior because the 
concept of qualified depends solely on disability as, with very rare exceptions, elite disabled 
athletes do not qualify for the Olympics.130 Therefore, "when the USOC links the eligibility 
124 Id at 339 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
12s Id 
12' Id 
121 Id 
128 ld 
129 Id at 339-40. 
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criteria for the receipt of these benefits to being an Olympic athlete, it essentially says 'Disabled 
Athletes Need Not Apply' ."l31 
The argument that the Hollonbeck case was decided incorrectly is flawed. The courts' 
adoption of such an argument would impermissibly broaden the protection of Title III in direct 
contradiction to the legislative intent in ratifYing the ADA. The legislative intent for ratifying the 
ADA was to protect disabled individuals and ensure that disabled individuals may "blend fully 
and equally" into American society.132 Legislative intent shows us that the law makers intended 
that disabled individuals become equal to able-bodied individuals. If the scholars' interpretation 
of Hollonbeck is embraced, different admission criteria would have to be adopted for disabled 
individuals as opposed to non-disabled individuals for entry into the same entities closed to the 
public. Such an outcome would make the two groups separate but not equal. The courts have 
even rejected the notion that accommodations could be made in instances where a disability 
hinders the individual but does not prevent them from partaking in the public accommodation 
entirely. 133 
B. Reasonably Modifying "Public Accommodations" 
When examining whether an organization would be a public accommodation within the 
purview of Title III, the courts focus on the "nexus" between the entity and the public 
accommodation facility. Even in instances in which the entity was found to be a public 
accommodation within Title III, the courts have scrutinized the physical facility connected to the 
entity. The cases which extend Title III to include entities as "public accommodations" have 
131 Id at 340. 
132 Rutkow, supra note I, at 414. 
133 See e.g. Logan v. Am. Contract Bridge League, 173 F. App'x 113 (3d Cir. 2006) (special card of decks for 
visually impaired player not reasonable modification because he could see the cards although sometimes made 
mistakes as to the card). 
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been most successful when the requested modification has focused on the physical premises used 
by the organization. 
Matthews 134 and PGA Tour135 addressed the question of whether a modification requested by 
the disabled individual was reasonable within Title III. For places of"public accommodation," 
failure to reasonably modifY "policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are 
necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to 
individuals with disabilities" is considered discrimination within the context of Title III. 136 The 
ADA states that modifications are reasonable unless such modifications fundamentally alter the 
nature ofthe "public accommodation. "137 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the courts have failed to articulate a standard for determining 
whether a requested modification to a public accommodation is considered reasonable. 138 The 
PGA Tour Court hinted at a standard while simultaneously emphasizing its fluidity. 139 The 
standard revolved around a three part analysis of reasonableness, necessity and fundamental 
alteration of the "public accommodation."140 
The reasonableness of the modification requested is determined on a case by case basis. This 
fluid analysis "considers, among other factors, the effectiveness ofthe modification in light of 
the nature of the disability in question and the cost to the organization that would implement 
134 See generally Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (whether waiving the 75/25 Rule was a reasonable modification 
for Matthews). 
135 See generally PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 682 (whether allowing Martin to use a golf cart in violation of the 
PGA Tour rules would be a fundamental modification of the nature of the tournament). 
136 42 U.S.C.S. § 12182(2)(A)(ii) (West 2009). 
137 !d. ("a failure to make reasonable modifications in po1icies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are 
necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with 
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature 
of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.") 
138 Rutkow, supra note I, at 425. 
139Jd 
140 Jd 
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it."141 The rationale for finding a modification unreasonable can be broadly divided into two 
categories, economic or administrative. 
In finding a modification to be economically unreasonable, the court must look to the cost of 
the modification. 142 If the cost would prevent the business from being financially viable due to a 
projected resulting decrease in revenue or the costs of the modification, the modification is 
economically unreasonable.143 The modification may also be considered administratively 
unreasonable if the cost of implementing the modification imposes too high a burden on the 
. 144 
entity. 
The PGA Tour Court also noted that a baseline requirement for an accommodation to be 
considered reasonable is that the proposed accommodation must be necessary as it ties into the 
particular plaintiffs disability. 145 In evaluating the necessity of the accommodation, the courts 
must look to the necessity of the accommodation in relation to the particular plaintiffs 
disability. 146 The courts' analysis looks to whether the modification, as presented, is necessary 
for that individual plaintiff. In PGA Tour, the plaintiff was unable to walk the distance of the golf 
course, therefore the requested accommodation of a golf court was a necessity and thus 
reasonable. 147 However, had the plaintiff been otherwise disabled but capable of walking the golf 
course, the golf cart would not have been a reasonable modification.148 
The necessity of the modification to be tailored to the individual seeking it becomes clear 
when the facts of PGA Tour are compared to those of Logan v. American Contract Bridge 
141 Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995). 
142 See Emery v. Caravan of Dreams, 879 F. Supp. 640, 644 (N.D. Tex. 1995), aft'd, 85 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1996). 
143 Id 
144 See Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1084. 
145 See PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 664-65. 
146 Id. 
147 Id at 682. 
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League. 149 In Logan, the plaintiff is a visually disabled life master, the highest rank a member 
may reach, of the American Contract Bridge League. 150 While the plaintiffs visual disability did 
not prevent his seeing the cards, the plaintiff sometimes confused standard playing cards due to 
his visual impairment. 151 The plaintiff requested that he be allowed to use a deck of cards 
especially designed for the visually impaired during bridge tournament play. 152 The Third Circuit 
rejected Logan's request to use a deck of cards especially designed for the visually impaired as 
an unreasonable modification. 153 The Logan court found that the pack of cards was not a 
reasonable modification because Logan's visual impairment allowed him to play bridge with a 
regular deck of cards, just not up to his full potentia!. 154 
Both Logan and PGA Tour concerned activities that could be considered recreational sports, 
with Logan involving bridge and PGA Tour involving golf tournaments. However, the disparate 
outcomes in the two cases can be explained by the fact that losing a bridge tournament would not 
constitute a life threatening event to the plaintiff in Logan, while walking in a golf tournament 
could potentially constitute a life threatening event for Martin as he had a high risk of blood clots 
due to his disability. However, both the plaintiff in Logan and Martin were highly accomplished 
players in their respective fields and the modifications requested by them would have merely 
enabled them to compete on the same level as their able bodied competitors. Therefore, such 
reasonable modifications should have been permissible under Title III. Furthermore, similar to 
the fact fmding that was undertaken by the PGA Tour Court, allowing the plaintiff in Logan to 
149 Logan v. Am. Contract Bridge League, 173 F. App'x 113 (3d Cir. 2006). 
150 Jd at 114. 
151 Id at 117. 
152 Id at 115. 
153Jd. 
154 Jd at 117. 
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use a special deck of cards would not put the able-bodied bridge players at a disadvantage and 
therefore should have been allowed as a reasonable modification under Title III. 
The last step of the analysis is whether the reasonable modification would 'fundamentally 
alter the nature of [the public accommodation]' .155 The fundamental alteration ofthe nature of 
the public accommodation comes in a variety of forms. 156 The modification may fundamentally 
alter the very nature of the public accommodation for both disabled and non-disabled individuals 
alike- such as changing the diameter of the hole in golf. 157 The modification may fundamentally 
alter the nature of the services provided, such as forcing hospitals to provide oxygen for both 
patients and visitors. 158 The modification may fundamentally alter the public accommodation by 
giving a disabled individual an unfair advantage over the able bodied person.159 
PGA Tour and Elitt give contrasting views as to what would entail a reasonable modification 
for an entity which is found to be a "public accommodation." In PGA Tour, although the entity 
was recognized as a "public accommodation," the modifications that were sought were to the 
tournament on the golf course itself. 160 PGA Tour must be contrasted with Elitt. In Elitt, while 
the hockey league played on a hockey rink which was indisputably a "public accommodation," 
the court found that the league itself did not constitute a "public accommodation."161 The Elitt 
court determined that there was an insufficient nexus between the hockey rink and the hockey 
league as mere use of the "public accommodation" did not make the organization a public 
accommodation. 162 While the Elitt court determined that the hockey league was not a "public 
155 PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 683. 
156Rutkow, supra note I, at 428. 
157 Id citing PGA Tour. Inc., 532 U.S. at 682-83. 
158 Id citing Dryer v. Flower Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 934, 940 (N.D. Ohio 2005). 
159 Id at 429 citing PGA Tour, Inc. 532 U.S. at 690. 
160 PGA Tour, Inc, 532 U.S. at 670. 
161 E/itt, 922 F. Supp. at 223. 
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accommodation," the court nonetheless examined whether the requested modifications would 
have been reasonable. 163 
There is only a fine line of distinction between the factual circumstances of PGA Tour and 
those found in Elitt. The organizations in both cases used public accommodations to stage their 
events. However, there was one key difference between the cases which led one court to find the 
modification reasonable and the other court to find the modification unreasonable. The requested 
modification in PGA Tour required a modification to the physical facility of the organization, a 
request to use a golf cart on a golf course.164 In stark contrast, the requested modification in Elitt 
was to the entity itself, as the plaintiff requested modification which would allow him to play 
hockey with a younger age group. 165 Similar to Hollonbeck, 166 the requested modification in Elitt 
was to the entity itself, and the courts have been consistent in holding that Title III protection, 
and by extension reasonable modifications, cannot be extended in instances when such 
protections would undermine the selection criteria set forth by the entity. Therefore, while the 
courts have extended "public accommodations" to encompass entities which use public facilities, 
the extension is presently limited to reasonable modifications sought for the physical facility 
controlled by the entities but not for the selective criteria of the entities themselves.167 
VI. Conclusion 
This note has explored how the courts have broadened the definition of a "public 
accommodation" to not only encompass physical facilities, but also entities which the courts 
have deemed to have a sufficient nexus to a physical facility. In expanding "public 
163 Id at 224-25. 
164 PGA Tour, Inc, 532 U.S. at 669. 
165 E/itt, 922 F. Supp. at 220. 
166 Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 513 F.3d 1191 (lOth Cir. 2008). 
167 See also, Tatum v. Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (NCAA is a public 
accommodation due to the influence it exerts on the athletic facilities of its member-universities.) 
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accommodation," the courts have rationalized that their holdings are in keeping with the ADA's 
stated legislative intent of providing the broadest possible protections to disabled individuals. 
Therefore, it appears that the "nexus" between the organizational entity and the physical facility 
will become more tenuous as more organizational entities are brought under the purview of Title 
III. Additionally, in understanding the courts' expansion of"public accommodation," it is also 
important to consider the requested reasonable modification. It would appear that courts are wary 
of imposing the modifications on the organization's selection protocol, instead preferring to 
focus the judicial remedy of modification on physical entity with which the organization has a 
nexus. 
Page 126 
